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Abstract
This article examines the use of precedent in the judgments of international criminal courts 
and tribunals. It finds that although such courts and tribunals have resorted to external 
judicial decisions as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law, in some cases, 
their use of external judicial decisions has been equivocal. Moreover, in two notable cases, 
these courts and tribunals have unequivocally relied on precedent as a direct source of 
law. In this context, the article offers some reflections on whether courts may serve as 
sources for the creation of rules of law. It finds that there does not seem to be any legal basis 
for the use of external judicial decisions as direct sources of rules of international law. There 
is, moreover, a danger that regarding external judicial decisions as direct sources may 
encourage a lax, uncritical reliance on such decisions.
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1. Introduction
In his study of the influence of case law of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) on the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), Nerlich states that ‘[t]raditionally, inter-
national lawyers have been reluctant to afford decisions of international 
* This article draws on research conducted as part of the author’s doctoral dissertation 
under the supervision of Professor Rosemary Byrne and with the assistance of the Trinity 
Postgraduate Research Studentship Award. With thanks to the School of Law, TCD. Any 
mistakes are the author’s only.
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tribunals the character of a source of law in its own right.’1 Nevertheless, in 
examining the practice of the ICTY, Nollkaemper finds that international 
criminal judges have, in some cases, endowed judicial decisions from other 
courts and tribunals (external judicial decisions)2 ‘with an apparent quasi-
independent authority that cannot be reduced to a constituent element of 
either customary international law or a general principle of (international) 
law.’3 This article focuses attention on the manner in which interna-
tional criminal courts and tribunals (courts and tribunals) have used exter-
nal judicial decisions and, in particular, whether these have been used as 
subsidiary means or as direct sources of law. It is also concerned with the 
question of whether courts may serve as direct sources of rules of interna-
tional law.
The article is based on a qualitative analysis of some of the final judg-
ments of (1) the ICTY; (2) the ICTR; (3) the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL); (4) the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC); 
and (5) the ICC. It should be highlighted that the article is exclusively  con-
cerned with the use of external judicial decisions and does not cover the 
use of internal jurisprudence within the same court.
The article is organized into four parts. The first part examines the use 
of external judicial decisions as means for the determination of rules of 
law. The second part examines cases in which the use of external judicial 
decisions by the courts and tribunals could be characterized as equivocal. 
The third part discusses two notable cases in which external judicial deci-
sions were used as direct sources of rules of law. And the fourth part offers 
some reflections on whether courts may serve as sources for the creation of 
rules of law, in particular, given their role in developing the law. Finally, the 
article concludes that there does not seem to be any legal basis for the use 
of external judicial decisions as direct sources of rules of international law. 
There is, moreover, a danger that regarding external judicial decisions as 
direct sources may encourage a lax, uncritical reliance on such decisions.
1 Volker Nerlich, ‘The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent in Proceedings Before the ICC’, 
in Carsten Stahn and Goran Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal 
Court (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 315.
2 This article makes use of the unimaginative phrase ‘external judicial decisions’ in order 
to avoid the baggage associated with the notion of ‘precedent’. In this context, see Nathan 
Miller, ‘An International Jurisprudence? The Operation of “Precedent” Across International 
Tribunals’ (2002) 15 LJIL 483, 489.
3 The author was writing specifically with respect to national judicial decisions. 
See Andre Nollkaemper, ‘Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An 
Analysis of the Practice of the ICTY’, in Gideon Boas and William Schabas (eds.), International 
Criminal Law Developments in the Case Law of the ICTY (Martinus Nijhoff 2003) 277.
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2. External Judicial Decisions as Means
The use of external judicial decisions may be characterised as ‘means’ for 
the determination of rules of law where a court or tribunal ascertains that 
their legal notions or findings would have been derived from one of the 
recognized sources of law. This language is based on Article 38(1)(d) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which states that the ICJ 
shall apply judicial decisions ‘as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law.’ Although, technically, this Article only constitutes a direction 
to the ICJ itself,4 it is generally considered to reflect customary interna-
tional law.5 Even where new courts and tribunals have incorporated their 
own provisions on applicable law, the legal basis for their reliance on 
external judicial decisions has continued to rest, largely, on the customary 
law rule corresponding to Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute. Therefore, for 
instance, although sub-paragraph (2) of Article 21 of the Rome Statute of 
the ICC provides that the ICC ‘may apply principles and rules of law as 
interpreted in its previous decisions,’ this sub-paragraph only relates to the 
ICC’s own previous decisions and not to the Court’s use of external judicial 
decisions. Similarly, Article 20(3) of the SCSL Statute, which states that 
‘[t]he judges of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court shall be guided 
by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda,’ only appears to reinforce the 
customary law rule that external judicial decisions may be used as subsid-
iary means for the determination of rules of law. Therefore, as noted, 
the legal basis for the use of external judicial decisions by these courts and 
tribunals continues to rest on customary international law as reflected in 
Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute.6
One of the prevalent views with respect to Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statue 
is that it establishes two distinct lists: sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) provide the 
formal sources of international law (international conventions, interna-
tional customary law and general principles of law); and sub-paragraph (d) 
4 Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International 
Law’ in Martti Koskenniemi (ed.), Sources of International Law (Ashgate 2000) 173.
5 Thus, for instance, Cassese makes reference to the customary law rule ‘corresponding’ 
to Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute; see Antonio Cassese, ‘The Influence of the European Court 
of Human Rights on International Criminal Tribunals - Some Methodological Remarks’, in 
Morten Bergsmo (ed.) Human Rights and Criminal Justice For the Downtrodden: Essays in 
Honour of Asbjorn Eide (Martinus Nijhoff 2003) 19.
6 In this context, the view is taken that the cross-reference to Article 59 of the ICJ Statute 
(‘[s]ubject to the provisions of Article 59’] binds only the ICJ and does not take on wider 
application with respect to other courts and tribunals.
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specifies the subsidiary means by which rules of law may be determined. 
For instance, the editors of Archbold on International Criminal Courts state 
that, under Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute, judicial decisions:
(…) do not constitute ‘sources’ of law. Rather such decisions (…) may be 
referred to in order to confirm or elaborate the content, application or 
interpretation of international conventions, international customary law or 
general principles of law. This is borne out by the language of paragraph (d), 
which does not seek to create a free-standing source of law, but rather 
identifies a ‘subsidiary means’ for the interpretation of rules.7
From the analysis carried out by this article, and with two notable excep-
tions, it would appear that these courts and tribunals have generally 
approached external judicial decisions as means. The use of external judi-
cial decisions as means may generally entail a two-tiered procedure: (1) a 
court or tribunal would satisfy itself that the legal notions or findings of a 
given external judicial decision are grounded on a rule of law derived from 
one of the recognized sources; and (2) the court or tribunal would use such 
legal notions or findings for guidance in the verification of the existence, 
state or proper interpretation of the same, or similar, rule of law. The fol-
lowing example seeks to illustrate this two-tiered procedure.
In Kupreskic et al., in considering the interpretation of other inhumane 
acts under Article 5(i) of the ICTY Statute, the Trial Chamber relied primar-
ily on a first-hand interpretation of the rules of law from which this provi-
sion was drawn, namely Article 6(c) of the London Agreement and Article 
II(1)(c) of Control Council Law No. 10.8 However, in this case, the Chamber 
also supplemented its first-hand interpretation by recourse to the legal 
notions or findings of external judicial decisions, in particular, the findings 
of the District Court of Tel Aviv in the Tarnek case.9 In this respect, the Trial 
Chamber broadly followed the two-tiered procedure. Firstly, it satisfied 
itself that, in Tarnek, the definition of ‘other inhumane acts’ laid down in 
the Israeli Law on Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) of 1950 had 
been drawn from the definition of Article 6(c) of the London Agreement. 
Secondly, the Trial Chamber used the findings of this case for guidance in 
its own interpretation of Article 5(i) of the ICTY Statute.10
7 Rodney Dixon and Karim AA Khan, Archbold on International Criminal Courts: Practice, 
Procedure and Evidence (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 12 (para 2-17).
8 Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, 
Dragan Papic, Vladimir Santic, also known as ‘Vlado’ (Judgment) IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000) 
para 562.
9 Tarnek case, District Court of Tel Aviv (14 December 1951).
10 Kupreskic et al. Trial Judgment (n 8) para 564.
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The courts and tribunals have regularly emphasized that external judi-
cial decisions may not constitute direct sources of law. For instance, in 
Kupreskic et al., the ICTY Trial Chamber held that ‘clearly, judicial prece-
dent is not a distinct source of law in international criminal adjudication.’11 
Similarly, the SCSL underscored that the decisions of the ad hoc Tribunals 
do not constitute direct sources.12 Moreover, the ECCC Supreme Court 
Chamber, in Duch, held that the principle of legality prevented a Chamber 
from creating new law13 and maintained, with reference to the judicial 
decisions of the ad hoc Tribunals, that such judicial decisions were ‘not, in 
and of themselves, primary sources of international law’.14 In their practice, 
these courts and tribunals have predominantly made use of external judi-
cial decisions as means for the determination of rules of law, rather than as 
direct sources of that law.
In a large number of cases, external judicial decisions have played a criti-
cal role in providing guidance to these courts and tribunals. For instance, 
in Furundzija, Judge Shahabuddeen noted that in interpreting a principle 
of law, courts and tribunals may ‘see value in consulting the experience 
of other judicial bodies with a view to enlightening [themselves] as to 
how the principle is to be applied in the particular circumstances before 
[them].’15 And in Kupreskic et al., the ICTY Trial Chamber acknowledged 
that it had relied heavily on external judicial decisions.16 According to 
Cassese, external judicial decisions may not be used as direct sources, but 
solely as means ‘in order to establish (i) whether a customary international 
rule has formed, or (ii) whether a general principle of international law 
exists, or to determine (iii) whether the interpretation of an international 
rule adopted by another judge is convincing and, if so, applicable.’17 In view 
of the specificities of international criminal law (ICL) and the context of 
11 Kupreskic et al. Trial Judgment (n 8) para 540. Emphasis added.
12 Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao (Judgment) SCSL-04-
15-T (2 March 2009) para 295 (‘RUF Trial Judgment’). See also Robert Cryer, ‘Neither Here 
Nor There? The Status of International Criminal Jurisprudence in the International and UK 
Legal Orders’, in Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad and Michael Bohlander (eds.), International Law 
and Power: Perspectives on Legal Order and Justice: Essays in Honour of Colin Warbrick 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 188.
13 Kaing Guek Eav alias ‘Duch’ (Appeal Judgment) 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC (3 February 
2012) para 95.
14 ibid para 97.
15 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija (Judgment) IT-95-17/1-A (21 July 2000), para. 258 
(Declaration Of Judge Shahabuddeen).
16 Kupreskic et al. Trial Judgment (n 8) para 537.
17 Cassese (n 5) 20. Emphasis omitted.
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international criminal proceedings, he observes that ‘this approach is 
necessary not only for reasons of legal rigour, but also to satisfy the funda-
mental requirements of the principle of fair trial, especially the obligation, 
derived from this principle, to respect the rights of the accused.’18
In the practice of these courts and tribunals, external judicial decisions 
have generally been used to confirm, or to elaborate the content, applica-
tion or proper interpretation of rules of international law. In this respect, 
in Duch, the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber underscored that, although 
the principle of legality prevented these courts and tribunals from creating 
new law or from interpreting existing law beyond the reasonable limits 
of acceptable clarification, this principle did not prohibit such courts and 
tribunals from relying on external judicial decisions which provided an 
interpretation or clarification of the law.19
The next part considers cases in which the reliance of these courts and 
tribunals on the legal notions or findings of external judicial decisions may 
be described as equivocal.
3. The Equivocal Use of External Judicial Decisions
As noted above, an examination of the theory and practice of these courts 
and tribunals suggests that they have predominantly used external judicial 
decisions as means. In some cases, they have used such decisions as 
auxiliary means, to supplement their own, first-hand interpretations of a 
given rule of law (thus, as subsidiary means). However, in other cases, 
these courts and tribunals have relied heavily, indeed, at times, exclusively, 
on the legal notions or findings of external judicial decisions to reach a 
particular determination, with little or no apparent effort on their part to 
conduct a first-hand examination of the rule of law in question. Occasion-
ally, moreover, these courts and tribunals have simply concurred with the 
conclusions reached by other external judicial decisions, adopting them 
uncritically and wholesale, without following the two-tiered procedure 
described above. As a consequence, their findings would be heavily reliant 
on the external judicial decisions and, from a reading of their judgments, it 
would be difficult to decipher whether they would have regarded them 
merely as subsidiary means or as direct sources of the rules in question. The 
following examples are meant to highlight this point.
18 ibid 21.
19 Duch Appeal Judgment (n 13) para 95.
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For instance, in the CDF case, in clarifying the meaning of the terms 
‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’, in the context of crimes against humanity 
under Article 2 of the SCSL Statute, the SCSL Trial Chamber relied, almost 
exclusively, on the findings of the ICTY.20 The SCSL Trial Chamber held:
In the Chamber’s view, the requirement that the attack must be either wide-
spread or systematic is disjunctive and not cumulative.21 The Chamber is of 
the opinion that the term ‘widespread’ refers to the large-scale nature of the 
attack and the number of victims, while the term ‘systematic’ refers to the 
organized nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random 
occurrence.22 The Chamber adopts the view that “[p]atterns of crimes - that is 
the non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular basis - 
are a common expression of such systematic occurrence”23 and further sub-
scribes to the interpretation of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Kunarac 
et al. case (…)24
On examining the above extract, it seems as though the SCSL Trial Chamber 
did not attempt to undertake any first-hand interpretation of the phrase 
‘widespread and systematic.’ Rather, it relied almost exclusively on exter-
nal judicial decisions. Indeed, except for two references to the same inter-
nal decision,25 the SCSL Trial Chamber’s analysis and findings were based 
exclusively on ICTY jurisprudence. Moreover, the two-tiered procedure 
was not followed in this case. Firstly, the SCSL Trial Chamber did not 
expressly satisfy itself that the external judicial decisions it relied on were 
grounded on a rule of law derived from one of the recognized sources. 
Secondly, rather than using the findings of the ICTY decisions for guidance, 
as a subsidiary means, the SCSL Trial Chamber appears to have borrowed 
and relied on them uncritically, in many instances, simply adopting or 
subscribing to the ICTY’s views.
20 Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa (Judgment) SCSL-04-14-T (2 August 
2007) para 112 (‘CDF Trial Judgment’).
21 Citing the ICTY decisions of, inter alia, (1) Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala and Musliu 
(Judgment) IT-03-66-T (30 November 2005) para 183; (2) Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and 
Vukovic (Judgment) IT-96-23 & 23/1-A (12 June 2002) para 97; and (3) Prosecutor v. Kordic and 
Cerkez (Judgment) IT-95-14/2-A (17 December 2004) para 93.
22 Citing the ICTY decisions of, inter alia, (1) Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgment (n 21) para 94; (2)
Prosecutor v. Blakic (Judgment) IT-95-14-A (29 July 2004) para 101; and (3) Limaj et al. Trial 
Judgment (n 21) para 183.
23 Citing the ICTY decisions of, inter alia, of (1) Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic 
(Judgment) IT-96-23 &. 23/1-A (22 February 2001) para 429; and (2) Kunarac et al. Appeal 
Judgment (n 21) para 94.
24 CDF Trial Judgment (n 20) para 112.
25 Namely, Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana and Kondewa (Decision on Motions for 
Judgment of Acquittal pursuant to Rule 98) SCSL-04-14-T (21 October 2005).
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In another example, the ICTY Trial Chamber, in Čelebići, relied heavily 
and equivocally on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in fleshing out the elements of ‘exceptional circumstances.’26 In 
his assessment of this case, Cassese considered that the ECtHR external 
judicial decisions were, in fact, used as means to assist the ICTY Trial 
Chamber in its own interpretation of the concept of exceptional circum-
stances.27 Nevertheless, the author admits that ‘it may be regretted […] that 
the Chamber did not point out the legal value and scope of its reference 
to the case law of the European Court.’28
Similarly, in Gotovina et al., the ICTY Trial Chamber had to consider 
the elements of plundering and looting of public and private property as 
an underlying act of persecution.29 The Chamber noted that the Nuremberg 
Judgment and some other post-WWII cases had established a ‘scale’ test 
and had only entered convictions for appropriations on a nation-wide 
scale. However, the Chamber subsequently referred to the Flick case,30 
wherein the American Military Tribunal had held that the scale of the 
appropriation was not the critical issue; rather, it was the impact of the 
appropriation on the victim. The ICTY Trial Chamber then proceeded to 
adopt this ‘impact’ test from the Flick case, while discarding the ‘scale’ test, 
without providing reasons for its decision. It is not immediately clear, 
therefore, whether the Flick case merely assisted the Trial Chamber in its 
own interpretation, or whether it was relied on as an independent source 
of the ‘impact’ test. Indeed, immediately after citing the Flick case, the 
Gotovina et al. Trial Chamber went on to state that its findings were 
‘[b]ased on the foregoing […]’31
In the examples discussed above, the courts and tribunals did not explain 
their approaches to the use of external judicial decisions. Even though 
it would generally appear that these courts and tribunals regarded their 
use of such decisions to be in conformity with Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ 
Statute – for instance, the Čelebići Trial Chamber stated that it had relied 
on ‘the various sources of international law as listed in Article 38 of the 
26 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic also known as ‘Pavo’, Hazim Delic, Esad 
Landzo also known as ‘Zenga’ (Decision on Motion for Provisional Release Filed by the 
Accused Zejnil Delalic) IT-96-21-T (25 September 1996) paras 19-31.
27 Cassese (n 5) 32.
28 ibid 32-33.
29 See Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak, Mladen Markač (Judgment) IT-06-90-T 
(15 April 2011) para 1818.
30 United States v. Friedrich Flick et al., American Military Tribunal (22 December 1947), 
in 6 TWC 1187, 1214-1215.
31 Gotovina et al. Trial Judgment (n 29) para 1821. Emphasis added.
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Statute of the ICJ’32 – in practice, their use of external judicial decisions 
may be described as equivocal.
Such an equivocal approach may, in part, stem from the scarcity of 
normative guidance on the appropriate use of external judicial decisions.33 
It may also relate, in part, to the backgrounds of the international judges. 
For instance, Cassese makes the point that judges from common law back-
grounds may be more likely to make equivocal use of external judicial deci-
sions.34 Similarly, Bantekas maintains that the vast majority of judges in 
these courts and tribunals ‘originated from common law backgrounds 
where precedent is a source of law and they proceeded to apply the same 
principle in international criminal adjudication, although there is no rule 
or method to that effect.’35
The next part examines two cases in which external judicial decisions 
were used as direct sources of a rule of law.
4. External Judicial Decisions as Sources
In the sphere of general international law, a number of authors writing 
with respect to the judicial decisions of the ICJ have found no difficulty 
in asserting that such decisions could themselves constitute independent 
sources of international law.36 However, in light of the specificities of ICL, 
such an approach to external judicial decisions would be highly problem-
atic, particularly in view of the principle of legality which, inter alia, ‘pro-
hibits judges legislating new substantive law.’37 In spite of this principle, 
there are at least two notable cases, in the sphere of international criminal 
law, in which external judicial decisions appear to have been used unequiv-
ocally as direct sources of rules of law. One case relates to a judgment of 
the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber and the other to a dissenting opinion 
32 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic also known as ‘Pavo’, Hazim Delic, Esad 
Landzo also known as ‘Zenga’ (Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) para 414 (‘Čelebići 
Trial Judgment’).
33 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Aldo Zammit Borda, ‘Precedent in 
International Criminal Courts and Tribunals,’ (2013) 2 CJICL 287, 288.
34 Cassese (n 5) 21.
35 Ilias Bantekas, ‘Reflections on Some Sources and Methods of International Criminal 
and Humanitarian Law’ (2006) 6 Int’l Crim L Rev 121, 131-132.
36 See, inter alia, Robert Y. Jennings, ‘The Judiciary, International and National, and the 
Development of International Law’ (1996) 45 ICLQ 1, 3-4; Fitzmaurice (n 4) 172-173; Mohamed 
Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (CUP 1996) 90.
37 Dixon and Khan (n 7) 1258 (para 17-39).
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within the ICTY Appeals Chamber. In both cases, after expressly finding 
that the recognized sources did not point to any applicable rules of law, 
the referring courts, or individual judges, nevertheless, proceeded to distil 
particular rules from certain external judicial decisions. In effect, therefore, 
those decisions constituted the original and direct sources of those particu-
lar rules.
The first case relates to the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber’s decision 
in Duch, where the Chamber had to determine the appropriate test for 
regulating adjudication of a multiplicity of offences for the same conduct 
(concursus delictorum), which was an issue of substantive criminal law.38  
In this respect, the Chamber firstly noted that neither the ECCC Law nor 
its Internal Rules expressly addressed this issue. It moreover proceeded 
to find:
[T]here is no treaty or customary international law specifically addressing 
concursus delictorum for international crimes. (.…) [Furthermore] it may not 
be said that a general principle of law exists on concurrence of multiple, 
distinct offences for the same conduct.39
Therefore, although the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber expressly found 
that it was not possible to identify any existing conventional or customary 
international law or general principles of law concerning the substantive 
issue of concursus delictorum, it did not decline to determine the matter. 
Nor did it resolve the ambiguity to the advantage of the Accused.40 On the 
contrary, the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber proceeded to rely on the ICTY 
Čelebići test,41 considering that this test ‘serves the interests of justice by 
ensuring that convictions entered against an accused reflect, accurately 
and in full, the extent of his or her criminal culpability.’42 In this case, there-
fore, the Čelebići test appears to have been used as an independent source 
of substantive law. Indeed, the adoption of this test may have been influ-
enced by considerations of substantive justice rather than strict legality.43 
Additionally, the Chamber also considered that ‘subsequent to the issuance 
38 Duch Appeal Judgment (n 13) para 289.
39 Duch Appeal Judgment (n 13) para 290.
40 In this case, the Chamber acknowledged that by virtue of the test it adopted, the 
Accused could suffer the ‘social stigma of being convicted of additional crimes.’ It is thus 
clear that this test was not the solution which best favoured the Accused. See Duch Appeal 
Judgment (n 13) para 295. See also Dixon and Khan (n 7) 1258 (para 17-39).
41 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic (aka ‘Pavo’), Hazim Delic, and Esad Landžo 
(aka ‘Zenga’) (Judgment) IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001) para 412-413.
42 Duch Appeal Judgment (n 13) para 295.
43 ibid.
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of the Čelebići Appeal Judgement in 2001, Chambers in the ICTY, ICTR, 
SCSL and ICC have uniformly applied the test.’44
The second case relates to Judge Li’s famous dissent in Erdemovic.45 Judge 
Li was considering the question of whether duress could be a complete 
defence to the massacre of innocent civilians at international law. He 
expressly found that ‘with regard to this question, there is neither applica-
ble conventional nor customary international law for its solution.’46 
Moreover, he also found that municipal law did not provide for a general 
principle of law in the sense of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ.47
In the absence, therefore, of applicable conventional and customary 
international law, as well as general principles of law, Judge Li proceeded 
to have recourse to the decisions of post-WWII courts and tribunals as 
independent sources of a particular rule of law.48 Nollkaemper notes that 
‘Judge Li took the position that legal norms might be inferred from case 
law, including national case law, and that the criteria for doing so were 
distinct from the identification of rules of customary law or general princi-
ples of law.’49
From his examination of these post-WWII decisions, Judge Li came to 
the conclusion that duress constituted a complete defence, subject, how-
ever, to the exception that it would not apply to heinous crimes.50 In his 
analysis of this approach, Jia states that ‘it appears that [Judge Li’s] conclu-
sion was meant to show that rules of law might be crystallized from case 
law, but that this crystallisation would be achieved in a manner different 
from that in which a custom is formed.’51
In the context of ICL, Jia proceeds to argue for an approach to external 
judicial decisions based on Judge Li’s approach, namely, to use external 
44 ibid para 300.
45 Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemovic (Judgment) IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997) para 1 
(Separate And Dissenting Opinion Of Judge Li).
46 ibid para 2.
47 ibid para 4.
48 Relating to the defence of duress. In this respect, Dixon and Khan note that Judge 
Li ‘referred to the decisions of Military Tribunals as a ‘source of law’ after finding that no 
general principles of law could be discerned on a particular question’. See Dixon and Khan 
(n 7) 13 (para 2-18).
49 Nollkaemper (n 3) 290.
50 Erdemovic Appeals Judgment (n 45) para 5 (Separate And Dissenting Opinion Of 
Judge Li).
51 Bing Bing Jia, ‘Judicial Decisions as a Source of International Law and the Defence 
of Duress in Murder or Other Cases Arising from Armed Conflict’, in Sienho Yee and Tieya 
Wang (eds.), International Law in the Post-Cold War World: Essays in Memory of Li Haopei 
(Routledge 2001) 78.
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judicial decisions ‘as a source of law.’52 It has to be said that Jia does 
not appear to be arguing for external judicial decisions to constitute a 
source of law in the technical sense – a formal and binding source of law.53 
Nevertheless, Jia’s proposal would appear to be problematic as it may 
encourage a lax approach to the use of external judicial decisions. According 
to Jia’s proposal, courts and tribunals would be able to rely heavily on exter-
nal judicial decisions of other courts and tribunals without critically assess-
ing whether such decisions were, inter alia, grounded on antecedent rules 
of international law. Although Jia concedes that the post-WWII jurispru-
dence examined by Judge Li must have been based on some antecedent 
source, according to his proposed approach, whereby external judicial 
decisions in and of themselves could constitute a source of law, there would 
be ‘no need’ to retrace such an antecedent source.54 As mentioned, this 
approach would seem to encourage a lax and mechanical attitude to exter-
nal judicial decisions. In this respect, it is significant that, with the excep-
tion of Judge Li, the remaining judges in Erdemovic,55 ‘all found it possible 
after reviewing and evaluating relevant post Second World War cases, to 
discern a general principle of law applicable to the problem at hand, and 
did not regard the Nuremberg Judgment as a ‘source’.’56
The next part offers some reflections, in the context of international 
criminal law, on whether courts may serve as direct sources of such law.
5. Some Reflections on Courts as Sources of Law
Writing in relation to the ICJ, Jennings states that he sees no great difficulty 
in regarding ICJ precedent as ‘being a source of the law, not merely by anal-
ogy but directly.’57 However, to hold that judicial decisions may constitute 
52 ibid 94. Emphasis added.
53 Jia underscores that ‘precedents in this field of international law are persuasive 
authorities, rather than binding decisions. This is clear from the fact that there is no rela-
tionship between the military tribunals and modern day international tribunals.’ See 
ibid 95.
54 ibid 94.
55 Namely, President Cassese and Judges McDonald, Stephen and Vohrah.
56 Dixon and Khan (n 7) 13 (para 2-18). Moreover, the authors make the point that ‘it is 
arguable that the Nuremberg Judgment is a source of law by dint of its principles being 
unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly: see, Nuremberg Principles: Principle of 
International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment 
of the Tribunal (1950), UNGAOR, 5th session, Supp No. 12, UN Doc A/1316 (1950)’; see ibid.
57 Jennings (n 36) 4.
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direct sources of rules of international law would appear to run counter to 
the approach that ‘[t]he sources of international law are generally consid-
ered to be exhaustively listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice’58 and, in the particular context of ICL, would appear to run 
counter to the principle of legality.
In accordance with this principle, judicial decisions may only constitute 
means for the determination of rules of law. The question, however, is how 
could the law develop through judicial decisions if those decisions were 
used exclusively as means for its determination? At first blush, there may 
seem to be an element of circularity. In this respect, Shahabuddeen points 
out, in relation to the decisions of the ICJ, ‘[i]f the decisions of the Court 
cannot make law but can contribute to its development, presumably that 
development ultimately results in the creation of new law; and, however 
minute this might be in any one instance, incrementally it acquires mass.’59
The apparent contradiction which Shahabuddeen refers to, however, 
seems to rest on a question of semantics: in particular, what is understood 
by the creation and development of the law? In the interests of clarity, 
it may be useful to keep these two, albeit related, concepts distinct. The 
‘creation’ of law is a legislative function which, in international law, in the 
absence of an international legislator or legislature,60 is carried out primar-
ily by states through the formal sources of law, namely international 
conventional and customary law and general principles of law.
In this context, Jennings notes that ‘[a] court has no purely legislative 
competence’61 and, in particular, it should be borne in mind that the prin-
ciple of legality operates to prevent these courts and tribunals from creat-
ing new law.62 But saying that courts and tribunals cannot create law is not 
the same as saying that these courts and tribunals cannot develop the law. 
In Duch, the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber emphasized that nothing 
prohibited these courts and tribunals ‘from interpreting and clarifying the 
law or from relying on those decisions that do so in other cases.’63 In this 
58 Erdemovic Appeals Judgment (n 45) para 40 (Joint Separate Opinion of Judge 
McDonald and Judge Vohrah).
59 Shahabuddeen (n 36) 68.
60 Fitzmaurice (n 4) 60. See also Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a ‘Dule’ (Decision on the 
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1-T (2 October 1995) para 43.
61 Robert Y Jennings, ‘The Judicial Function and the Rule of Law in International 
Relations’ in Roberto Ago (ed.), International Law at the Time of its Codification (III, A. 
Giuffrè, 1987) 144–145.
62 See Prosecutor v. Ojdanić et al. (Appeal Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Chal-
lenging Jurisdiction-Joint Criminal Enterprise) IT-99-37-AR72 (21 May 2003) para 38.
63 Duch Appeal Judgment (n 13) para 95.
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respect, one of the staunchest proponents of the view that courts and tribu-
nals cannot create law, Cassese, acknowledged that international criminal 
judges may ‘undertake a gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liabil-
ity through judicial interpretation from case to case, provided that the 
resultant development is consistent with the essence of the offence and 
could reasonably be foreseen.’64 In this context, Cassese’s view was based 
on the following holding of the ECtHR in the case of Streleyz, Kessler and 
Krenz v. Germany:
[H]owever clearly drafted a legal provision may be, in any system of law, 
including criminal law, there is an inevitable element of judicial interpre-
tation. There will always be a need for elucidation of doubtful points and 
for adaptation to changing circumstances […] Article 7 of the [European 
Convention on Human Rights] cannot be read as outlawing the gradual 
clarification of the rules of criminal liability through judicial interpretation 
from case to case, provided that the resultant development is consistent with 
the essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen.65
The development of the law, rather than its creation, therefore, is generally 
regarded as a legitimate judicial function. By performing their function of 
interpreting and applying existing rules of law in relation to the particular 
circumstances of each case, courts and tribunals inevitably bring about 
its development. It should be recalled that, through their decisions, courts 
perform the unparalleled function of converting the law from a formal 
source into a written and applied state, a process that has been described 
as ‘a major change’.66 Particularly when published, judicial decisions 
become ‘part and parcel of the legal sense of the community’.67
Furthermore, the development of the law could be regarded, not only 
as a legitimate, but also as an indispensable judicial function. The neces-
sity  for courts and tribunals to develop the law, and the related need to 
use external judicial decisions,68 seems to be incontestable. This is so, not 
only with respect to procedural norms,69 but also with respect to the 
64 Cassese (n 5) 50.
65 See S.W. v. United Kingdom and C.R. v. United Kingdom quoted in the case of Streleyz, 
Kessler and Krenz v. Germany (Applications nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98 (22 March 
2011) para 50. See also Dixon and Khan (n 7) 1258 (para 17-39).
66 Jennings (n 36) 62.
67 Hersch Lauterpacht quoted in Shahabuddeen (n 36) 1.
68 Particularly, but not exclusively, in the formative years of such courts, when they 
would have few internal precedents to draw upon.
69 See Goran Sluiter, ‘Procedural Lawmaking at the International Criminal Tribunals’, in 
Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly (eds.), Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal 
Tribunals (OUP 2010) 315.
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substantive law. In this context, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Kupreskic et al. 
noted that:
the Tribunal’s need to draw upon judicial decisions is only to be expected, due 
to the fact that both substantive and procedural criminal law is still at a 
rudimentary stage in international law. In particular, there exist relatively few 
treaty provisions on the matter. By contrast, especially after World War II, a 
copious amount of case law has developed on international crimes.70
However, courts and tribunals are not permitted to interpret existing law 
beyond the reasonable limits of acceptable clarification.71 It should be 
recalled that the authority of courts and tribunals to interpret and develop 
particular aspects of the law is a derived power. In this respect, this power 
has to be used with circumspection and, particularly in the context of 
ICL, remains subject, inter alia, to the principle of legality. Such courts and 
tribunals may only develop rules of law by reference to, and on the basis of, 
antecedent law. Even Jennings, with respect to the ICJ, seems to concede 
this point:
The Court must (…) be seen to be applying existing, recognized rules, or 
principles of law. Even where a court creates law in the sense of developing, 
adapting, modifying, filling gaps, interpreting, or even branching out in a new 
direction, the decision must be seen to emanate reasonably and logically from 
existing and previously ascertainable law. (…) [W]hatever juridical design 
[the Court] decides to construct in its decision, it must do so, and be seen to 
do so, from the building materials available in already existing law. The design 
may be an imaginative artefact, but the bricks used in its construction must be 
recognisable and familiar.72
Although, clearly, the primary task of any court or tribunal is not to develop 
the law, but to dispose of a case before it in accordance with the law, ‘this is 
not to say that it is no part of the judge’s task to develop the law. It clearly 
is, not least in international law. But it is to say that any “development” 
must be necessary for, and incidental to, the disposal of the actual issues 
before the court.’73 Any such development has to emanate reasonably and 
logically from existing and previously ascertainable law, in accordance 
with the principle of legality.
Therefore, although there is some truth in the assessment that ‘the differ-
ence between making and determining law is one of degree rather than 
70 Kupreskic et al. Trial Judgment (n 8) para 537.
71 Duch Appeal Judgment (n 13) para 95.
72 Jennings (n 61) 145.
73 Judge Jennings cited in Shahabuddeen (n 36) 232.
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one of kind,’74 the point is that the concepts of ‘creation’ and ‘development’ 
of the law ought to remain distinct, and it would appear inaccurate to assert 
that these courts and tribunals may create new law through judicial inter-
pretation or that their decisions may be used as direct sources of law. They 
do, however, have the power to legitimately develop the law in a particular 
area, as long as their interpretations and clarifications are seen to emanate 
reasonably and logically from existing and previously ascertainable law.
In light of these observations, it is submitted that notions such as judicial 
‘creativity’ to describe the interpretations undertaken by some courts and 
tribunals ought to be used with caution.75 In this context, Shahabuddeen 
draws a distinction between ‘creativity’ and ‘activism’. He considers that 
‘judicial creativity (…) fashions new law but, by contrast with judicial activ-
ism, does so on the basis of the policy of the law as it can be extracted from 
the roots of the law.’76 However, insofar as an interpretation is extracted 
from the roots of antecedent law, and so long as it is conducted within 
the reasonable limits of acceptable clarification, then this would appear to 
be the exercise of legitimate judicial conduct, grounded not on creativity, 
but on necessary legal reasoning and judicial interpretation. If, however, 
the notions of creativity and activism are used as bywords for ‘highly cre-
ative interpretative approaches’77 which interpret existing law beyond 
the reasonable limits of acceptable clarification, then such approaches 
should rather be called for what they are – transgressions of the principle 
of legality.
6. Concluding Remarks
This article has found that, in the majority of cases, international criminal 
courts and tribunals have used external judicial decisions as means for the 
determination of rules of law. However, in some cases, they have relied 
heavily, indeed, at times, exclusively, on the legal notions or findings of 
external judicial decisions, with little or no apparent effort on their part to 
conduct a first-hand examination of the rules of law in question. Their use 
of external judicial decisions could therefore be described as equivocal. 
74 ibid 77.
75 Consider the use of this term, inter alia, in Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly (eds.), 
Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals (OUP 2010).
76 Mohamed Shahabuddeen, ‘Judicial Creativity and Joint Criminal Enterprise’, in Darcy 
and Powderly ibid 184.
77 Shane Darcy and Joseph Powderly, ‘Introduction’ in Darcy and Powderly (n 75) ibid 2.
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Moreover, in two cases, the article found that the courts, or individual 
judges, have appeared to use external judicial decisions as direct sources of 
rules of international law.
In this context, there does not seem to be a clear legal basis, in either 
conventional or customary law, for the use of external judicial decisions as 
direct sources of rules of international law. On the contrary, such use of 
external judicial would seem to contravene the principles of legality and 
fair trial, as it would increase the margin for arbitrariness and reduce the 
foreseeability of such decisions. In this context, Cassese notes:
If the defence knows in advance the legal logic that can and will be followed 
by the judges, their conclusions may reasonably be anticipated. If, on the 
contrary, the judges proceed a little “too rapidly”, their reasoning is less 
foreseeable, and the defence is deprived of the means to reasonably anticipate 
the judges’ conclusions.78
Furthermore, the use of external judicial decisions as direct sources of 
law would seem to encourage a lax, uncritical reliance on such decisions. 
This may be particularly problematic if they are relied on wholesale and 
without appropriate transposition, by courts and tribunals based within 
very different legal frameworks. This is particularly so when one bears in 
mind that these courts and tribunals may bring about a development in the 
law in the context of their very specific legal regimes. For example, Grover 
underscores that, although the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals is 
rich, it would be a mistake for those working at the ICC to import it whole-
sale because of the distinctiveness of the respective statutes.79
In accordance with the doctrine of sources, therefore, judicial decisions 
may only serve as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
This does not only imply, however, that external judicial decisions may not 
constitute direct sources of international law, but also that these courts and 
tribunals should, firstly, endeavour to determine rules of law through the 
primary means of judicial interpretation and should only subsequently 
revert to external judicial decisions as subsidiary means. In particular, such 
courts and tribunals should avoid relying on external judicial decisions 
mechanically and equivocally, and should ensure that any legal notions or 
findings borrowed from external judicial decisions be appropriately and 
expressly transposed to take into account the specificity of ICL and their 
own legal frameworks.
78 Cassese (n 5) 21.
79 Leena Grover, ‘A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the Interpretation 
of Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (2010) 21 EJIL 543, 550.
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In the final analysis, the use of external judicial decisions as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law should not be considered as an 
adequate and complete substitute for a first-hand analysis and interpreta-
tion of the relevant rules of law by a referring court or tribunal. In particu-
lar, any legal notions or findings derived from external judicial decisions 
may require extensive analysis and transposition before they may be intro-
duced into their new environment. As Cassese notes, this approach is nec-
essary not only for reasons of legal rigour, but also to satisfy the fundamental 
requirements of the principle of fair trial.80 The use of external judicial 
decisions should not, therefore, be considered as a ‘quick fix’ solution for 
the determination of the relevant rules of law. However, when approached 
with appropriate circumspection, external judicial decisions may provide 
invaluable guidance in the determination of rules of law by, for example, 
identifying some of the relevant issues to be considered in a particular case 
and providing a useful structure for analysis.81 Ultimately, therefore, the 
judicious use of external judicial decisions may serve to render a court or 
tribunal’s analysis more thorough and, thus, persuasive.
80 Cassese (n 5) 21. Emphasis omitted.
81 For a discussion of the assistance which may be derived from the use of external 
judgments in the domestic sphere, see Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human 
Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20 OJLS 499, 
507.
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